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Abstract
The aggregation of consistent individual judgments on logically inter-
connected propositions into a collective judgment on those propositions
has recently drawn much attention. Seemingly reasonable aggregation
procedures, such as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure an
equally consistent collective conclusion. The literature on judgment ag-
gregation refers to that problem as the discursive dilemma. In this paper,
we motivate that many groups do not only want to reach a factually right
conclusion, but also want to correctly evaluate the reasons for that conclu-
sion. In other words, we address the problem of tracking the true situation
instead of merely selecting the right outcome. We set up a probabilistic
model analogous to Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) and compare several
aggregation procedures by means of theoretical results, numerical simu-
lations and practical considerations. Among them are the premise-based,
the situation-based and the distance-based procedure. Our findings con-
firm the conjecture in Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008) that the
premise-based procedure is a crude, but reliable and sometimes even op-
timal form of judgment aggregation.
1 Introduction
Members of a group often have to express their opinions on several propositions.
Examples are all kinds of committees such as expert panels, legal courts and
advisory boards. The set of propositions at stake is the agenda of the group.
Once the members have stated their views on the issues in the agenda, the
individual judgments need to be combined to form a collective decision.
The aggregation of individually consistent judgments on logically intercon-
nected propositions into an equally consistent group judgment has recently
drawn much attention. Such problems constitute the emerging field of judgment
aggregation (List 2007). A judgment is an assignment of yes/no to a proposi-
tion. The problem is that a seemingly reasonable aggregation procedure, such
as propositionwise majority voting, cannot ensure a consistent collective conclu-
sion. In this paper we compare several procedures with respect to their ability
∗Contact information: Stephan Hartmann, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of
Science, Tilburg University, 5037 AB Tilburg, S.Hartmann@uvt.nl
†Contact information: Jan Sprenger, Tilburg Center for Logic and Philosophy of Science,
Tilburg University, 5037 AB Tilburg, jan.sprenger@gmx.net
1
A B C
Voter 1, 2, 3 Yes Yes Yes
Voter 4, 5 Yes No No
Voter 6, 7 No Yes No
Majority Yes Yes No
Table 1: An illustration of the discursive dilemma under the constraint rule
A ∧B ↔ C
to track the truth. Thus, the resulting collective judgment should not only be
factually right or wrong, but also contain a correct assessment of the situation.
In other words, we present results concerning the ability of several methods to
aggregate conflicting individual judgments into a decision that is substantiated
by the correct reasons.
Here is an illustration. The Israeli Prime Minister asks an advisory board
of military and security experts whether to engage on a military strike against
an Iranian nuclear site. All board members agree that military action should
be taken if and only if the Iranian nuclear program does not only serve civil,
but also military purposes (represented by proposition A, referred to as the
first premise) and if the Iranian Government is preparing military aggressions
against Israel (represented by proposition B, referred to as the second premise).
Taking military action is represented by proposition C, also referred to as the
conclusion. The doctrine can be formally expressed as the formula (A∧B)↔ C.
Each member of the advisory board expresses her judgment on A, B and C such
that the rule (A ∧ B) ↔ C is satisfied. Suppose now that the committee has
seven members who make their judgments according to table 1. We see that,
although each committee member expresses a consistent opinion, proposition-
wise majority voting results in a majority for A and B, but in a majority for
¬C.1 This is clearly an inconsistent collective result as it violates the rule
(A ∧B)↔ C. The paradox (called the discursive dilemma) rests with the fact
that propositionwise majority voting can lead a group of rational individuals
to endorse an inconsistent collective judgment. Clearly, the relevance of such
aggregation problems goes beyond the specific example: It applies to all situa-
tions where individual binary evaluations need to be combined into a judgment
of the entire group.
The discursive dilemma is the point of departure for two different research
programs. The first program investigates how many plausible adequacy criteria
can be met by a single aggregation function. Recent results by List and Pettit
(2002) and Dietrich and List (2006) indicate that Arrow’s theorem on the im-
possibility of certain preference aggregation functions can be generalized to a
theorem on the impossibility of certain judgment aggregation functions. How-
ever, we prefer to work in the second program, to take a constructive approach
and to evaluate the various ways to consistently aggregate judgments from an
epistemic perspective (Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006). Here, two goals have to
be discerned. The most natural goal consists in selecting the factually right
outcome (i.e. to take or not to take military action) regardless of whether the
1For reasons of simplicity, we represent propositional variables as well as realizations of
those variables by capital letters in italics.
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reasons for the decision are correctly discerned. Indeed, for the Israeli Prime
Minister the desire to make a factually correct decision might be more important
than giving the correct reasons for her decision: She has to avert a potential
danger from her people and she must not expose soldiers to the risks of a futile
military strike. Compared to the perils of choosing a wrong outcome, being
wrong about the reasons seems to be a minor problem. In Hartmann, Pigozzi
and Sprenger (2008) we pursue this route and investigate which aggregation
procedure most often selects the right outcome. Sometimes, of course, right de-
cisions are made for the wrong reasons. Suppose that Iran is actually preparing
a military nuclear program, but merely with defensive intentions (e.g. in order
to deter the United States from an invasion). The Isreali intelligence service
erroneously comes to the opposite result – Iran has aggressive intentions, but it
does not have a serious military nuclear program. The resulting decision not to
take military action is factually right because the errors cancel out each other,
but it would have been taken for the wrong reasons. If new evidence revealed
that the Prime Minister’s assessment of the situation was wrong, she would
come under pressure and the trust in her competence would decline. The right
decision which she took would be judged as a matter of mere luck.
This example illustrates that, although panels and committees will often
merely care for factually right decisions, neglecting the reasons for a decision
can have embarrassing consequences, too. A similar case already occurred: Be-
fore the Iraq war, the US Government charged Iraq with reproaches to possess
and to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. When these accusations turned
out to be wrong, the reputation of the US Government greatly suffered, regard-
less of whether the decision to open the war against Iraq was factually in the
country’s interest or not. As the reasons for the invasion of Iraq were not truth-
ful, the relevant decision-makers were perceived either as incompetent fools or
as Machiavellian liars. Therefore we sometimes need aggregation procedures
that do not only select a factually right outcome, but also find out the right
situation. In the judgment aggregation problem, we identify a situation with
any consistent judgment on the sets of propositions at stake. The four situations
that are consistent with the constraint rule (A ∧B)↔ C are
S1 = {A,B,C} S2 = {A,¬B,¬C}
S3 = {¬A,B,¬C} S4 = {¬A,¬B,¬C}
Selecting the true situation amounts to making a correct judgment on all propo-
sitions, regardless of which situation is true:
1. If S1 were true, then S1 would be chosen.
2. If S2 were true, then S2 would be chosen.
3. If S3 were true, then S3 would be chosen.
4. If S4 were true, then S4 would be chosen.
An aggregation procedure that satisfies those four conditions is said to track
the truth. This account of truth-tracking can be brought in line with Nozick’s
(1981) account of knowledge and truth-tracking. According to Nozick, a method
of aggregating judgments would track the truth of a situation S if and only if
Stability If S were true, then S would be chosen.
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Sensitivity If S were not true, then S would not be chosen.
It is easy to see that sensitivity is satisfied whenever an aggregation procedure is
stable with respect to all possible situations. Thus, the former set of conditions
entails stability and sensitivity so that truth-tracking methods in our sense also
track the truth of any situation in Nozick’s sense.
To our mind, the problem of tracking the true situation (over and above
making a factually correct decision) is important whenever institutional and
individual decision-makers have to publicly justify their decisions and when
they are responsible, liable or accountable for the decision which they have
made. Such situations can roughly be subdivided into two different types: First,
a right decision for the wrong reason often triggers costly revisions. Take the
case of a job applicant who is turned down for fallacious reasons. Stating wrong
reasons gives the applicant a chance to formally contest a negative decision
even if she is not a suitable candidate. Similarly, in a lawsuit, a factually right
decision of the court (e.g. to sentence the culprit) can be contested and revoked
because the grounds for the judgment are fallacious. Such situations are open
to costly revision.
Second, whenever decision-makers support a decision by means of their per-
sonal or institutional authority, there is the danger of reputation loss. In aca-
demic practice, a journal referee usually accompanies her recommendation by
a list of reasons. For instance, let us assume that the referee opts for rejection
because she believes the author’s essential argument to be invalid. In fact, the
argument is sound, but the paper has other deficits which the referee fails to
notice. For example, the premises of the arguments are highly contestable or
relevant literature is not taken into account. If the editor discovers that the ref-
eree’s recommendation is not well substantiated (though factually correct), she
might eliminate her from the journal’s list of referees. The examples from poli-
tics (Israel/Iran conflict, Iraq invasion) can also be subsumed under the label of
reputation loss.2 Thus, in those two types of situations – formally contestable
and reputation-intensive decisions – truth-tracking becomes an essential issue,
over and above the need to make a factually right decision. Moreover, there
are not only practical drawbacks – the epistemic evaluation of a decision is also
affected: If a correct decision is generated by fallacious beliefs (e.g. because
the errors cancel out each other), we will hesitate to say that this decision was
justified. In particular, we would deny that the decision-makers knew which
decision they had to take.
When a factually right outcome is to be selected, two major escape routes
from the discursive dilemma have been suggested and compared (Bovens and
Rabinowicz 2006; List 2005, 2006): the premise-based procedure (PBP) and
the conclusion-based procedure (CBP). In the PBP, the committee members
vote separately on each of the premises A and B. The aggregate vote on A
and B, determined by simple majority voting, fixes the collective judgment on
{A,B,C}, according to the constraint (A ∧ B) ↔ C. According to the CBP,
the members decide privately on A and B and only express their opinions on C
publicly. The judgment of the group is then inferred from applying the majority
rule to the individual judgments on C. In the case of the example presented
in table 1, the PBP recommends to conduct a military strike whereas the CBP
advises the board members not to take military action. In the next section, we
2An overlap between both types of situations is possible, but not necessary.
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construct a similar version of the discursive dilemma for the problem of tracking
the truth and introduce a new procedure: the situation-based procedure (SBP).
Then, we compare it to the distance-based procedure (Pigozzi 2006) and the
PBP in terms of tracking the truth and adopt a Bayesian perspective to show
the general superiority of the PBP.
2 Aggregation procedures
In the discursive dilemma, the conclusion-based procedure suppresses in general
the reasons for the final decision since it only counts the votes for the conclusion.
Obviously, this implies that the CBP cannot track the true situation. Due to
that problem, Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006) introduce a novel procedure which
we call modified conclusion-based procedure (MCBP). That procedure opts for
situation Si if and only if more than half of the group members support Si
(Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006, 139). In other words, situation Si is selected if
and only if an absolute majority of group members support it. Consequently,
MCBP gives an indeterminate result when there is only a relative, but no ab-
solute majority for a specific situation. In their calculations of the reliability of
MCBP (formula (21) on page 139), Bovens and Rabinowicz treat those indeter-
minate cases as cases in which MCBP gives a wrong result. Since indeterminate
decisions count as fallacious decisions, the reliability of MCBP is quite poor
– in particular, it is always outperformed by PBP. Due to the aforementioned
indeterminacy, this result is not surprising. So, instead of appraising PBP pre-
maturely, Bovens and Rabinowicz should amend MCBP to a well-defined proce-
dure without indeterminate cases and compare that procedure to PBP. Unlike
the comparison in their paper, this would be a fair contest. We close that gap in
this paper. Besides, Bovens and Rabinowicz do not make explicit that MCBP
is not the original conclusion-based procedure. The original conclusion-based
procedure CBP is unable to discern between S2, S3 and S4 whereas MCBP can
sometimes distinguish between those situations (namely, when they are sup-
ported by an absolute majority of group members). Therefore, it is misguided
to compare the relative performance of the conclusion-based procedure in the
right outcome problem vs. the right situation problem (Bovens and Rabinowicz
2006, 141-145) – actually, there are two conclusion-based procedures at stake
and they are quite different.
For tracking the truth and making a right decision for the right reasons, the
form of the logical constraint rule (so far: (A∧B)↔ C) does not matter: When
the reasons for a decision are correctly discerned, the conclusion is correctly
discerned, too, regardless of the exact form of the logical constraint rule. For
instance, when we have correctly assessed the truth values of A and B, we have
also correctly assessed the truth value of A∨B, A→ B, etc. Thus, aggregation
procedures for tracking the truth equally apply to all conclusions that are truth-
functional compounds of A and B.
Maybe the most natural way to make a judgment on the right situation
consists in voting separately on the premises, as in the original case of judg-
ment aggregation. However, the premise-based procedure has some awkward
consequences. Suppose that in a panel of 2N + 1 voters, there is a tie be-
tween S1 (A/B/C) and S4 (¬A/¬B/¬C) – S1 and S4 are each supported by
N voters. In other words, there is maximal disagreement between the first 2N
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group members. Now, the last voter is in a pivotal position – the collective
judgment is sensitive to her vote. Even worse, the group judgment just copies
her judgment. In other words: If she votes for S1, the group endorses S1, if she
votes for S2, the group endorses S2, etc. It seems that this voter has obtained
too much relative weight. In particular, a collective decision for S2 can result
even if this situation is merely supported by a single voter. This contradicts
the intuition that the chosen situation should be backed by more than a single
voter, especially in large groups. Pragmatic factors often require the panel to
support the group judgment (e.g. when standing up to the public), and the
premise-based procedure allows for situations where almost no one agrees with
the group judgment. Moreover, even the implementation of the PBP may be
difficult under some circumstances. For any kind of decisions that take a stand
on more than one issue (e.g. on A and B), formal requirements can make it
difficult to schedule two separate ballots (one on A and one on B, as the PBP
demands). For instance, a board may have to decide between different motions
that assert something about A and B, and splitting the motions may be for-
mally impossible. This asks for a procedure where the collective judgment is
gained in a single ballot, i.e. not by a ballot on the premises, but by a ballot on
entire situations. Such procedures are situation-based because they are based on
judgments on entire situations, not on single propositions. There, the collective
judgment is a function of the number of voters that support S1, the number
of voters that support S2, etc. Among the possible situation-based aggregation
methods, we focus on a plurality-based method: the situation which receives
the highest number of votes is accepted. This corresponds to a widely applied
practical convention that, when different proposals compete against each other,
the one with the highest number of votes goes through. We call this procedure
the situation-based procedure (SBP). Note that the SBP extends Bovens and
Rabinowicz’s MCBP: It agrees with MCBP if there is an absolute majority for
a specific situation, but it also yields a definite result in all other cases.
To define the SBP properly, we have to introduce some terminology. In a
group of N persons, there are n1 persons who back S1 (i.e. they judge A, B
and C to be true), n2 persons who back S2, and so on. Every member of the
group supports exactly one of these situations (corresponding to her judgments
on A and B). Hence, n1+n2+n3+n4 = N . Now, the premise-based procedure
chooses the situation where the truth value assignments to the premises are
backed by a majority of voters, i.e. a decision for S1 is made if and only if the
following two inequalities are satisfied:
n1 + n2 > n3 + n4 n1 + n3 > n2 + n4 (1)
The necessary and sufficient criteria for accepting another situation are analo-
gous (see appendix). Since N is assumed to be an odd number, equality can
never occur. Hence, PBP works in the same way as in the case of choosing the
right outcome. By contrast, SBP opts for S1 if the function χ1, defined below,
returns value 1. Ties are resolved by chance experiments: with equal probabil-
ity, one of the situations with the highest number of votes will prevail. More
refined tie-breaking rules are, of course, possible and lead to different versions
6
A B C Situation
Voter 1 Yes Yes Yes S1
Voter 2 Yes Yes Yes S1
Voter 3 Yes Yes Yes S1
Voter 4 No Yes No S3
Voter 5 No Yes No S3
Voter 6 No No No S4
Voter 7 No No No S4
Majority No Yes No S1
Table 2: An illustration of the discursive dilemma when the right situation is
to be selected.
of the situation-based procedure.3
χ1(n1, n2, n3, n4) =

1 n1 > max(n2, n3, n4)
1/2 (n1 = n2) ∧ (n1 > max(n3, n4))
1/2 (n1 = n3) ∧ (n1 > max(n2, n4))
1/2 (n1 = n4) ∧ (n1 > max(n2, n3))
1/3 (n1 = n2) ∧ (n1 = n3) ∧ (n1 > n4)
1/3 (n1 = n2) ∧ (n1 = n4) ∧ (n1 > n3)
1/3 (n1 = n3) ∧ (n1 = n4) ∧ (n1 > n2)
0 otherwise
(2)
It is interesting to see under which circumstances both procedures disagree.
If the votes are distributed according to table 2, the PBP selects situation S3
whereas the SBP selects S1: S1 is supported by three voters whereas situations
S3 and S4 obtain only two votes each, and no one supports situation S2. Thus,
there is a simple majority for S1, and PBP and SBP fall apart. That example
creates a new version of the discursive dilemma: In the traditional problem of
selecting the right outcome under the aggregation rule A∧B ↔ C, the premise-
based procedure sometimes opts for the conclusion C when the conclusion-based
procedure opts for ¬C. In a similar vein, when we try to track the truth and
to select the right situation, the situation-based procedure and the premise-
based procedure can equally opt for different situations, as witnessed by table
2.4 Hence it is a non-trivial question which procedure we should adopt when
3Note that the SBP is strategy-proof when truth is the common good of the group members
and not strategy-proof when verisimilitude (coming to the truth as close as possible) is the
common good. Consider the example of table 2 – three voters vote for S1, two for S3 and two
for S4. The SBP will then select S1. Now, the voters who believe S4 to be the right situation
could reason that S3 is closer to the (allegedly) true situation S4 than the situation S1 which
is backed by most voters. If they already knew the votes of the other group members, they
could decide to conceal their real opinion and to vote for the lesser evil S3 – S1 is more
distant from the putative truth than S3. Note that voters 6 and 7 did not have any egoistic
motivation – they voted insincerely because they wanted to promoted the common good of
the group, namely verisimilitude. Only if full truth is the goal (i.e. only if the degree of error
does not matter), SBP becomes strategy-proof. By contrast, PBP is always strategy-proof –
no voter has a reason to conceal his true opinions if she wants the truth to be detected by the
aggregate judgment.
4Note that in the original version of the discursive dilemma where the goal consists in
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aiming at the true situation. Which aggregation procedure should the Isreali
Prime Minister use? On which procedure should committee members who care
for a correct decision agree? In order to respond to those questions, the next
section introduces a probabilistic model which allows to assess the epistemic
performance of both procedures and to compare it to the distance-based pro-
cedure (DBP) (Konieczny and Pino-Pe`rez 1999; Konieczny and Gre´goire 2006;
Pigozzi 2006). In the example of table 2, DBP would average all individual
votes into the vector (5/7 yes, 5/7 yes, 3/7 yes) which is closest to the situation
S1 = (yes, yes, yes).
3 Comparing the procedures
3.1 Preliminaries
In order to investigate the epistemic reliability of the various aggregation pro-
cedures, we adopt a probabilistic framework. In particular, we assign to every
group member an individual competence p ∈ (0, 1) to make a correct judgment
on a single premise. More precisely, when a premise (either A or B) is true,
the voter gives a correct report with probability p+, and equally, if the premise
is false, the voter gives a correct report with probability p−. Then, the overall
competence of the voter to evaluate the truth value of the premise A can be
calculated as
p = p+ P(A) + p− (1− P(A)) (3)
Moreover, we assume that the voters are not biased towards the truth or the
falsity of a proposition: p := p+ = p−. In other words, the probability of a
false positive report on a premise equals the probability of a false negative re-
port. Thus, the competence of an individual voter (p) is decoupled from the
prior probability of the propositions at stake, and the frequency with which
she makes correct or incorrect judgments does not depend on the truth values
of the propositions in question.5 Now, the Condorcet Jury Theorem links the
competence of the voters to the reliability of majority voting: Assume that the
individual votes on a proposition A are independent of each other, conditional
on the truth or falsity of that proposition. If the chance that an individual
voter correctly judges the truth or falsity of A is greater than fifty percent (in
other words, p > 0.5), then majority voting eventually yields the right collective
judgment on A with increasing size of the group (N →∞). The Condorcet Jury
Theorem thus offers an epistemic justification to majority voting and motivates
the use of the premise- and conclusion-based procedure in the judgment aggre-
gation problem (Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006). It should be noted, though,
selecting the right outcome, the votes of table 2 would lead to agreement of PBP and CBP.
5Setting p+ = p− also answers List’s concerns (List 2006) that for a very low value of
p+ or p−, the voters are bad at tracking the true situation since one of Nozick’s subjunctive
conditionals (see page 3) would be violated. This violation can occur even if the overall
reliability p, as defined in (3), is high.
Note that we ascribe an individual competence only for voting on premises, not for voting on
any truth-functional compound of A and B (such as A∧B). In many contexts it is reasonable
to assign individual voting competence to ‘elementary’ propositions only. For instance, in
the introductory example, propositions as ‘Iran’s nuclear program serves military purposes’
or ‘Iran plans a military aggression against Israel’ naturally play the role of such elementary
propositions, rather than ‘Iran has a military nuclear program and aggressive intentions’.
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that an application of the Condorcet results to judgment aggregation requires
further assumptions in order to reduce computational complexity, in particular
1. A and B are logically independent.
2. All voters have the same (independent) competence to assess the truth of
A and B (p). Their judgments on A and B are independent.
3. Each individual judgment set is logically consistent.
Notably, we are allowed to dismiss the original conditions of Bovens and Ra-
binowicz (2006) and Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008) who also demand
that the prior probabilities of A and B are equal (P(A) = P(B)) and that A
and B are probabilistically independent. The various symmetry properties of




P(Si)P(PBP opts for Si|Si)
= P(PBP opts for S1|S1) (4)
and similarly for SBP (see the theorem in subsection 3.3). In other words, the
reliability of PBP and SBP does not depend on which situation is actually the
case and is independent of the prior probability of the various situations. The
reliability of PBP and SBP is thus only a function of N and p, which greatly
simplifies the calculations.
3.2 Simulations
Now we proceed to a numerical comparison of the premise-based and the situation-
based procedure. First, we plot the reliability (=truth-tracking ability) of PBP
and SBP as functions of p, for fixed N (see figure 1).












Figure 1: Reliability of the PBP (full line) and the SBP (dashed line) as a
function of p, for N = 7 (left figure) and N = 15 (right figure).
Both graphs resemble Condorcet curves – for an individual competence sig-
nificantly higher than 0.5 both curves rise steeply until the reliability approaches
1. Indeed, it can be proven that for increasing group size, the reliability of both
procedures approaches 1 for voters that are better than randomizers:
Proposition 1. For N →∞, the premise-based and the situation-based proce-
dure select the right situation P-almost surely (P-a.s.) if and only if p > 0.5.
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So for very large groups of voters, the epistemic performances of PBP and
SBP will resemble each other. However, this is an asymptotical property, and
for small to medium-sized groups, the PBP will usually perform better, in agree-
ment with the remarkable performance of PBP at selecting the right outcome
(cf. Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger 2008). Moreover, both curves intersect at
p = 0.5. So it is tempting to conjecture that the reliability of PBP always ex-
ceeds the reliability of SBP for voters that are better than randomizers (p > 0.5)
whereas it is the other way round for voters that are worse than randomizers
(p < 0.5). Indeed, we later give an analytic argument for this claim. How-
ever, the performances of the two procedures are already quite close to each
other for medium-scaled group size (e.g. N = 7, 15), as figure 1 shows. By the
way, numerical simulations indicate stability if the tie-breaking rules in SBP are
altered: no significant changes occur.
Now we consider a special case of the aggregation problem, namely to detect
the correct situation under the logical constraint rule (A∧B)↔ C. For this con-
straint rule, we compare our two procedures PBP and SBP to the distance-based
procedure (DBP) known from Pigozzi (2006). The distance-based procedure se-
lects the collective outcome that has the lowest distance to the averaged vote of
the group members. Unlike PBP and SBP, DBP is sensitive to a choice of the
prior probabilities of the situations. Following Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006)
and Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008), we parametrize the set of prior
distributions by q ∈ [0, 1] where
P(S1) = q2; P(S2) = P(S3) = q(1− q); P(S4) = (1− q)2 (5)
For a defense of this parametrization, see the above sources. It incorporates


















Figure 2: Reliability of the PBP (diamonds), the SBP (triangles) and the DBP
(stars) as a function of N if each situation is equally likely (q = 0.5). The left
figure shows p = 0.6, the right figure shows p = 0.7.
probabilistic independence between A and B as well as the assumption that A
and B are a priori equally likely. First, we have plotted the reliability of the
three procedures as a function of N for the default prior probability q = 0.5
(where each situation is equally likely). Besides, we have assumed standard
values for the voters’ individual competence, namely p = 0.6 and p = 0.7.
This yields the result shown in figure 2 – DBP’s performance comes close to
PBP’s performance for low values of N , but then it gradually deteriorates and
eventually falls below the performance of SBP. For the former case (p = 0.6),
an even stronger claim can be made: The reliability of DBP will eventually not
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S1 true S2 true S3 true S4 true
select S1 1 0 0 0
select S2 0 1 0 0
select S3 0 0 1 0
select S4 0 0 0 1
Table 3: A standard utility matrix for the judgment aggregation problem, shown
as a function of the possible actions and situations.
converge against 1 with increasing N – this is only the case for p > (
√
5−1)/2.6
Apart from that, the novel plots confirm the findings from figure 1: the PBP
performs somewhat better than the SBP other while the margin in favor of
PBP declines with increasing individual competence p. To quantify the effect


















Figure 3: Reliability of the PBP (diamonds), the SBP (triangles) and the DBP
(stars) for fixed p = 0.6 as a function of N . The left figure shows q = 0.3, the
right figure shows q = 0.7.
of the prior probability q on the performance of the distance-based procedure,
we have varied this parameter to q = 0.3 and q = 0.7 for fixed p = 0.6 (figure
3). The curves of PBP and SBP are not sensitive to a change in q (remember
the remark at the end of section 2) and correspond to the curves in the left
graph of figure 2. But DBP is remarkably good for q = 0.3 – it is roughly as
reliable as PBP – and remarkably bad for q = 0.7, except for very small N . To
explain that difference, note that DBP has a certain bias against the situation
S1 = (A,B,C). The lower q, the less likely this situation and the more does the
bias of DBP against S1 improve its performance. In total, the figures teach us
that for small values of q, when the board should be cautious with respect to
S1, DBP is a reasonable means of incorporating this caution. But for medium
and large values of q, DBP should be rejected in favor of the premise-based
procedure.
3.3 A Bayesian perspective
Let us now return to the introductory example where the Israeli Prime Minister
consults an expert board. She might find comfort in our result that adopting
the collective judgment that was gained by majority voting on the premises is a
good strategy: The performance of PBP is reasonable for nearly all parameter
values. Even if the individual competence p and the prior probabilities q are not
6This property of DBP is shown in proposition 2, section 3 of Hartmann, Pigozzi and
Sprenger (2008).
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known or hard to estimate, the PBP provides a good mechanism for tracking
the true situation. But is it also the optimal way to proceed? Actually, the
Prime Minister might have some surplus information, e.g. she might know the
reliability of the members of the security board or know the ‘objective probabil-
ities’ of A and B. This information has to affect her interpretation of the board
members’ judgment. The Prime Minister is then best perceived as a Bayesian
updater: she updates her prior beliefs, expressed by P (Si), i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, on
the votes of the group members. The judgment profiles of the board members
are incoming evidence E which she uses to update her prior beliefs to a posterior
distribution over the (Si)i≤4:
P(Si|E) = P(Si)P(E|Si)∑4
i=1 P(Sj)P(E|Sj)
This posterior distribution describes the rational degree of belief in the various
situations, given the verdicts of the voters and their individual reliability. Now
we make the simplifying assumption that each right judgment has the same
utility, say 1 (i.e. correctly tracking S1 is as valuable as correctly tracking S2,
etc.). Furthermore, each wrong judgment has the same utility, say 0 (i.e. missing
the true situation S1 in favor of S2 is as harmful as missing S1 in favor of S3,
etc.). These assumptions are made explicit in table 3.7 Bayesian situation
selection is now solely based on the posterior probabilities of the situations
given the evidence and the utility matrix. Such decision rules are Bayes rules,
i.e. they minimize the expected risk with regard to the prior distribution among
all decision rules, see Result 1 in Berger (1985, 159). In particular, it is not
possible to do better than an expected-utility-maximizing procedure based on
the posterior probability distribution. For the utility matrix of table 3, a risk-
minimizing decision rule has to select the situation with the highest posterior
probability among all situations. This situation need not coincide with the one
favored by PBP or SBP.
It is quite natural that Bayesian updating outperforms PBP, SBP and DBP
since it may use additional information, e.g. the reliabilities of the board mem-
bers. But what looks as a virtue can actually be a vice. Bayesian updating is
in general only superior if the decision-maker’s prior beliefs correspond to ‘ob-
jective probabilities’ in the world (e.g. the relative frequency of the occurrence
of A compared to the occurrence of ¬A). However, in general we cannot elicit
those probabilities. Then, a Bayesian approach has no advantage over the crude
premise-based or situation-based procedures. Moreover, the applicability of the
Bayesian approach is restricted since it takes an external perspective: Admit-
tedly, a benevolent dictator will typically behave like a Bayesian: she has her
own prior beliefs, updates them on the judgments of an advisory board and her
estimates of the individual reliability of the board members. The final deci-
sion is then based on her posterior distribution and her personal utility matrix.
But if the board has to make a decision itself, the Bayesian model does not
apply. Once the group members have deliberated and agreed on a probability
distribution for S1-S4, there is no need to update it on individual votes since
all relevant information was already contained in that distribution. Still, the
7Our considerations are invariant under the question whether ‘utility’ refers to the practical
or the epistemic value of an action in a specific situation. For both applications, the identity
matrix seems to be the default utility matrix.
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Bayesian model can serve as a benchmark for the other procedures. So far, we
have evaluated the relative performance of PBP, SBP and DBP with respect
to each other. Since Bayesian updating is theoretically optimal if full informa-
tion (on p and q) is available, we might now check whether and when other
procedures coincide with the Bayesian approach.
Here, it is remarkable that the judgments of the Bayesian procedure cor-
respond to the judgments of PBP as long as q = 0.5 and p > 0.5: When all
situations are equally likely the Bayesian procedure selects the situation which
makes the actual results most likely. For p > 0.5, this is the situation where
the judgments on the premises are backed by a majority of voters (details in
the appendix). Hence, the Bayesian and the premise-based procedure agree,
vindicating the theoretical optimality of PBP for this special case. Actually,
this result can be generalized: PBP uniformly outperforms all aggregation pro-
cedures that are not inclined towards specific situations, regardless of the prior
probabilities of the Si.
Definition 1. A judgment profile J is a 2N -tuple (a1, b1, a2, b2, . . . , aN , bN )
where the ai and bi are binary variables with values in {Y (es), N(o)}. The set
of possible judgment profiles is denoted by J = {Y,N}2N .
Definition 2. An aggregation function (aggregation procedure) f is a function
from the sets of judgments profiles and the sets of situations to the unit interval
(i.e. f : J × {S1, S2, S3, S4} → [0, 1]) so that for any (ai, bi)1≤i≤N :
4∑
j=1
f(a1, b1, . . . , aN , bN ;Sj) = 1.
We interpret the value of f(J, Si) as the probability with which, for a judgment
profile J , situation Si is selected. The aggregation function is random if there
is a judgment profile J and a situation Si so that f(J, Si) /∈ {0, 1}.
Definition 3. An aggregation function f is unbiased if and only if the following
equations hold:
f(a1, b1, . . . , aN , bN ;S1) = f(a1,¬b1, . . . , aN ,¬bN ;S2)
f(a1, b1, . . . , aN , bN ;S1) = f(¬a1, b1, . . . ,¬aN , bN ;S3)
f(a1, b1, . . . , aN , bN ;S1) = f(¬a1,¬b1, . . . ,¬aN ,¬bN ;S4)
(6)
Unbiasedness means that the voters are not biased in favor of a specific
situation and only listen to the evidence, or in other words, the judgments of the
voters are impartial with respect to the names of the situations. In particular,
a judgment profile that champions S1 would, if all judgments were inverted,
speak for S4 to an equal degree.
Fact 1. PBP and SBP (but not DBP) are unbiased aggregation functions.
With these definitions at hand, we have an analytic way to demonstrate the
superiority of PBP which was indicated by the numerical simulations.
Theorem. Let the group members be individually be more competent than ran-
domizers (i.e. p > 0.5). The premise-based procedure PBP is better at tracking
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the true situation than any other unbiased procedure, for any value of N and p,
and any prior probability distribution over the possible situations.
In other words, if the group members are not too incompetent, PBP is the
best truth-tracking procedure among all aggregation procedures that are just
functions of the judgment profiles and do not have an inclination towards a
specific situation. In particular, it is superior to SBP and related procedures.
This is the one lesson which the Bayesian perspective teaches us. The second
lesson is the useful distinction between internal and external decision-making:
Bayesian updating gives a model for making optimal use of the judgments of an
advisory board, but not for decision-making inside such a board. The next and
final section of the article summarizes the results.
Remark. The theorem implies that for p > 0.5, PBP always outperforms SBP.
But the conjecture that PBP is always superior to SBP is wrong. Quite to
the contrary, SBP is more reliable than PBP for p < 0.5 which can be proven
analogously to the above theorem. In other words, if the jury members are
severely biased against the truth, SBP outperforms PBP.
4 Discussion and Summary
In this paper, we have approached the problem of judgment aggregation from
an epistemic perspective and focussed on the problem of tracking the truth
and selecting the right situation, over and above selecting the right outcome.
First we have motivated that there are relevant circumstances where truth-
tracking becomes an issue, namely situations where costly revisions or loss of
reputation threaten. Second, we have argued against Bovens and Rabinowicz’s
(2006) analysis of the truth-tracking problem. Third, we have proposed new
alternatives to the premise-based procedure (PBP), among them the situation-
based procedure (SBP) and compared them to the distance-based procedure
(DBP) and a Bayesian approach. We have set up a probabilistic model to
evaluate the various procedures.
The model adopts a Bayesian perspective to calculate and to compare the
truth-tracking abilities of PBP, SBP and DBP. Numerical simulations indicate
that the PBP outperforms the distance-based procedure as long as the prior
probability of the premises is not too low. More importantly, we have shown
that the PBP uniformly outperforms a large class of procedures that satisfy
some plausible unbiasedness requirements, among them the SBP. For a specific
prior distribution (q = 0.5), the PBP is even theoretically optimal at tracking
the truth. From an externalist perspective, agents are thus justified to apply
PBP because reliable truth-tracking methods justify the conclusions which they
yield. Nevertheless, if more information is available, e.g. if an external decision-
maker knows the individual reliabilities of the board members, she will abandon
the PBP in favor of straightforward Bayesian updating. If a board is to make
a decision itself, this is not applicable, however. In such cases, PBP’s stunning
performance suggests its application.
Hence, the surprising power of PBP found in the case of outcome selection
(Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger 2008) transfers to the problem of situation
selection, too. On the other hand, numerical results indicate that the SBP is
often only marginally less reliable than PBP. This is a substantial achievement:
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First, practical reasons may speak against implementing PBP – it might be
impossible to cast ballots for the premises. Second, we sometimes require that
a collective judgment is supported by more than a faction of the entire group
which is not guaranteed by PBP. Under those circumstances, SBP provides a
decent alternative although it is not strategy-proof. From a purely epistemic
perspective, PBP should always be favored over SBP; but the loss of reliability
when using SBP is tolerable and sometimes even marginal.
Some questions remain open, among them the behavior of the investigated
procedures when the strong assumptions of our model are relaxed. For instance,
in Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008) we relax the independence assump-
tions and allow for opinion leaders as well as for correlation in the judgments
on the various premises. Doing those calculations for the truth-tracking prob-
lem would go beyond the scope of this paper, but it is a fruitful and important
avenue for further research.
A Details for the premise-based procedure
Let ‘+SPBPi ’ denote a decision for situation Si under the premise-based pro-
cedure, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Selecting a situation comes with a judgment on the
truth value of the premises A and B. The premise-based procedure opts for a
situation where those judgments are backed by a majority of voters, i.e.
+SPBP1 ⇔ n1 + n2 > n3 + n4 ∧ n1 + n3 > n2 + n4
+SPBP2 ⇔ n1 + n2 > n3 + n4 ∧ n1 + n3 < n2 + n4
+SPBP3 ⇔ n1 + n2 < n3 + n4 ∧ n1 + n3 > n2 + n4
+SPBP4 ⇔ n1 + n2 < n3 + n4 ∧ n1 + n3 < n2 + n4
We assume N = n1 + n2 + n3 + n4 to be odd. So equality can never occur.
Now it is interesting to note that the probability to choose Si (‘+SPBPi ’) given
that Si is the case is constant in i. Given that Si is true, PBP makes such a
decision if and only if there are at least (N + 1)/2 correct votes on premise A
and there are at least (N + 1)/2 correct votes on premise B. The number of
correct votes on each premise is binomially distributed according to BN,p and










(cf. equations (5) and (10) in Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006)). This establishes
that the probability of tracking the true situation (RPBP) is independent of














In other words, the PBP’s reliability is independent of the prior distribution
over the Si.
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B Details for the situation-based procedure
The definition of the SBP and the proof of the theorem (see appendix C) entail
that the reliability of SBP is independent of prior probabilities of the various
situations. Therefore, the probability of tracking the truth RSBP is equal to
P(+SSBP1 |S1). Now we introduce some random variables. a is the number of
votes for A and under S1, it is distributed according to the binomial distribution
BN,p. b1 counts the number of votes for premises A and B, and its distribution
is b1 ∼ Ba,p. Finally, b2 counts the number of votes for B that do not endorse
A, and it is distributed according to BN−a,p.8 Clearly, b1 = n1, a− b1 = n2 so
that
χ(n1, n2, n3, n4) = χ(b1, a− b1, b2, N − a− b2)
By paying attention to the definition of χ, we can now express the reliability
of SBP and eliminating some superfluous terms in order to save computation
time:








































pa+b1+b2(1− p)2N−a−b1−b2χ(b1, a− b1, b2, N − a− b2)
This term is the basis of the SBP-plots in section 3 of the paper.
C Proofs
Proof of the Theorem: The proof proceeds in two steps: First, we show
that the reliability of any unbiased aggregation procedure is independent of the
prior probability distribution over (S1, S2, S3, S4). Second, we show with the
help of a Bayesian argument that for a particular prior distribution, the PBP
outperforms all other unbiased procedures. Due to the first part of the proof,
this entails that PBP is the best among all unbiased procedures.
8Note that b1 and b2 are independent so that their sum is distributed as b1 + b2 ∼
Ba,pFBN−a,p = BN,p, vindicating that the number of votes for B has the same distribution
as the number of votes for A.
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x P(f(a1,¬b1, . . . , aN ,¬bN ;S2) = x|S2)
= P(+S2|S2).
In the fifth step, we have applied our assumptions. The same calculations can
be done for S3 and S4, leading to
P(+S1|S1) = P(+S3|S3) P(+S1|S1) = P(+S4|S4)
which in turn entail
P(+Si|Si) = P(+Sj |Sj) ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. (8)
With the help of (8), it follows that the reliability R of any unbiased procedure
equals
R = P(+S1|S1). (9)
The right hand side of equation (9) is independent of the probability distribution
over the situations Si. It is merely a function of the parameters N , p and the
aggregation function f . For comparing the reliability of unbiased aggregation
functions we can thus presuppose without loss of generality that
P(Si) = P(Sj) = 1/4 ∀i, j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}.
In this case, we already know from section 3.3 that the best truth-tracking
procedure is given by choosing the situation with the highest posterior proba-
bility. Since the prior distribution over (S1, S2, S3, S4) is uniform (see (10)), this
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amounts to selecting the situation Si which makes the evidence most likely, i.e.
the situation which has a positive log-likelihood ratio with respect to all other
situations. The log-likelihood ratio of situation Si to situation Sj as a function
of the data (a, b) is denoted by Lij(a, b). a and b denote the number of votes
for premise A and premise B and are binomially distributed random variables
(a, b ∼ BN,p). Now, we show that the PBP always selects a situation Si where
Lij(a, b) > 0 for all j 6= i. Without loss of generality, let a, b > N/2 (the other
cases are analogous). Then S1 is selected by PBP and indeed,


















Thus, the premise-based procedure is optimal for q = 0.5 and it cannot be
outperformed by any other unbiased procedure. 
Proof of Proposition 1: The asymptotic behavior of the PBP and DBP
has already been examined – see proposition 2 and the appertaining proof in
Hartmann, Pigozzi and Sprenger (2008). Hence, we have to show that the SBP
eventually becomes perfectly reliable for p > 0.5 and N →∞. Assume that S1
is true (this does not lead to a loss of generality due to RSBP = P(+SSBP1 |S1),
see the proof of the theorem). We will not care for the tie-break rules and
show the stronger claim that for increasing N , P-a.s. n1 > max(n2, n3, n4).
Again, we take a (the number of votes for premise A) and b (the number of
votes for premise B) as given. Then x1 – the number of votes for S1 – is
hypergeometrically distributed, with parameters N , b and a. With increasing
N , the distribution of x1 becomes increasingly skewed around its mean value





⇔ 2b > N.
Due to the Strong Law of Large Numbers, 2b > N will eventually be satisfied
P-a.s. so that x1 > a/2 and S1 will obtain more votes than S3. The same
argument can be used to show that S1 will eventually obtain more votes than
S2. Finally, since a/N, b/N → p > 0.5, the SLLN entails that there are in the
limit more votes for S1 than for S4 (P-a.s.).9
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